When parents are altruistic toward children, the choices of fertility and consumption come from the maximization of a dynastic utility function. The maximization conditions imply first, an arbitrage condition for consumption across generations, and second, the equation of the benefit from an extra child to the net cost of rearing that child. These conditions Imply that fertility in open economies depends positively on the world Interest rate, on the degree of altruism, and on the growth of child-survival probabilities;
1.

IntroductIon
The economic approach to fertility has emphasized the effects of parents' income and the cost of rearing children. The most important determinants of cost have been employment opportunities of children, the value of parents' time spent on child care, monetary and psychological costs of avoiding births through abstinence and birth-control methods, and the interaction between the "quality" and quantity of children.
With the exception of work by Richard Easterlin (19'73 ) and a few others (e.g., Becker [1981. Chapter 7] ), studies that use an economic approach have neglected the analytical links between decisions by different generations of the same family. Moreover, despite Maithus's famous precedent, fertility has not been integrated with the determination of wage rates, interest rates, capital accumulation, and other macro variables (exceptions include Razin and Ben Zion [1975] and WillIs (1985] ). This paper and a sequel develop an economic analysis of both linkages in fertility across generations and of the interaction between fertility and various macro variables (see Rarro and Becker [1985] for an earlier version).
In the present paper, wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each family and toopen economies;-the sequel considers the determination of interest rates, wage rates, population growth, and capital accumulation In closed economies.
Our model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward children--hence, the utility of parents depends on the utility of each child as well as on the consumption of parents. By relating the utility of children to their own consumption and to the utility of their children, we derive a dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption and number of descendants In all generations. We venture to use the word 'reformulation" In the title because of our emphasis on dynastic utility functions and the number of descendants In all generations. The reformulated approach provides a new way of looking at the determination of fertility.
Section 2 sets out a model of altruism toward children, and derives the budget constraint and utility function of a dynastic family. The first-order conditions to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends positively on interest rates and the degree of altruism, and negatively on the rate of growth in the consumption of descendants. Consumption of a descendant is positively related to the difference between the cost of rearing a descendant and the value of his lifetime earnings.
Section 3 considers the effects of child mortality, subsidies to (or taxes on) children, and social security and other transfer payments to adults. Among other things, we show that the demand for surviving children rises during the transition to low child mortality. However, this demand returns to its prior level once mortalIty stabIlIzes at a lOW level.
Section 4 considers fertility and population growth in economies linked to an international capital market but not an International labor market.
Among other results, we show that fertility is reduced by declines in
International interest rates, and by increases In an economy's rate of technological progress. This analysis of fertility in open economies may contribute to the explanation of low fertility in Western countries during the past couple of decades.
Section 5 extends the analysis to include full life-cycle variations In consumption, earnings, and utility. We show that fertility depends on the expenditure on the subsistence and human capital of children, but not on expenditures that simply raise the consumption of children. We show also for demographic steady states, that aggregate consumption does not depend on interest rates, time preference or other determinants of life-cycle variations in consumption.
A Model of Fertility and Population Change
We assume that each person lives for two generations, childhood and adulthood. By assuming only one period of adulthood we omit life-cycle considerations. However, we show in section 5 how to combine a life-cycle analysis with the intergenerational forces that we stress in sections 2-4.
For simplicity, we pretend that each adult has children without "marriage."
We believe that production of children through marriage of men and women would not affect the essence of the analysis. We also bypass issues related to the spacing of children by assuming that parents have all of their children at the beginning of adulthood.
Economic analyses of fertility have assumed that the utility of parents depends on the number and 'quality' of children, usually without any specification of how or why children affect utility. Although agnosticism about preferences is common among economists, a more powerful analysis of fertility and population change can be obtained by building on recent discussions of altruism toward children.
The importance of altruism within families began to be recognized systematically by economists during the 1970s (two early studies are Barro [1974] and Becker [1974] ). Obviously many parents are altruistic toward their children in the sense that the utility of parents depends positively on the utility of children. This paper relies heavily on the assumption of altruism toward children to generate a dynamic analysis of population change.
If the utility of a parent were an additively-separable function of own consumption, denoted c0, and the utility of each child, then
where U0 Is parental utility, v is a standard utility function (with v' > 0, v'' < 0), U11 is the utility of the ith child, and n0 Is the number of children. Since reactions by parents to differences among their children are With the further assumption that the function * is proportional to U1, so that #(U1, n0) = U1a(n0), parent's utility would be given by 'See the discussions In Becker (1981, Chapter 6), Sheshlnski and Weiss (1982), and Behrrnan, et al. (1982) .
The term a(n0) measures the degree of altruism toward each child, and converts the utility of children Into that of parents. We assume that, for given utility per child U1, parental utility Is Increasing and concave in the number of children n0.
This property, together with equation (3), requires the altruism function to satisfy the conditions,
a(n0) ÷ n0a'(n0) > 0 and 2a'(n0) + n0a'(n0)
where we neglect integer restrictions on the number of children.
We assume that the parameters of a parents utility function are the same for all generations of a dynastic family. Therefore, the utility of each child, U1, depends as in equation (3) on own consumption, c1, and on the number, n1, and utility, Uj,, of own children. If the presentation is simplified by neglecting utility during childhood (see section 5), then ;je have after substituting for U In equation (3) (5)
Note that U2 is the utility of each grandchild, and n0n1 is the number of grandchildren.
Utility functions like that in equation (3) have been criticized for neglecting altruism toward grandchildren (md perhaps great-grandchildren, etc.). Equation (5) shows that this criticism Is invalid because, Indirectly, grandparents are altruistic toward grandchildren. A sore subtle claim is that the indirect altruism toward grandchildren must be weaker than the direct altruism toward children. Even this criticism does not necessarily hold, because the utility function in equation (5) does not require the altruism toward grandchildren to be less than that toward children. This property holds only if a(n1) < 1.
The utility of great-grandchildren would appear In the utility function If in equation (5) were replaced by terms that depend on c2, n2 and U3.
By continuing to substitute later consumption and fertility, we arrive at a dynastic utility function that depends on the consumption and number of children of all descendants of the same family line. This dynastic utility function can be expressed as
where A. Is the inplied degree of altruism of the dynastic head toward each descendant in the ith generation, as given by
Is the number of children per adult in generation J, N. is the number of descendants In the ith generation, as given by At a point where a parent has one child, a = 1, we can say that a parent is 'selfish' If the marginal utility of his own consumption exceeds the marginal utility that he derives from his child's consumption. This definition implies a(1) < 1 for selfish parents. Since the utility of a dynastic family with stationary consumption per person (c1 = c) and a stationary number of descendants (N. = 1) would be bounded only i aCi) < 1, we assume that parents are "selfish.'
The analysis simplifies greatly if the degree of altruism toward children has a constant elasticity with respect to the number of children--that is,
.-i(n. ) = iu. specifically, A. = '(N.). We use this simplification for the subsequent analysis. Then the condition 0 < a(l) < 1 requires 0 < < 1. and the condition that parental utility is increasing and concave In the number of children for given utility per child (as ensured by the inequalities in expression (4)) corresponds to 0 < 1.
By substituting the altruism function from equation (9) into the expression for dynastic utility in equation (t3), we get Adults leave a bequest of (non-depreciable) capital, to each child. e assume as a convention that bequests occur at the beginning of period 1. Since the capital k. earns rentals at the rate r., an adult in generation i spends his total resources, w. + (1 rik., on own consumption.
2The labor-leisure choice can readily be incorporated by including leisure along with consumption in they function, and by considering a 'full-income" budget equation (see ramura, 1985) .
C., on bequests to children, n1k11, and on costs of raising children. We assume that each child costs ,&, so that n1/31 is the total cost of raising children to adulthood. Therefore, the overall budget condition for an adult in generation I is (12) w. ÷ (1 ÷ r1)k1
The parameter represents a cost of raising children that is Independent of the 'quality" of children (as measured by their consumption, c.
, wage rate, w. , or inheritance, k ). To capture the emphasis in the
fertility literature on the value of parents' time, we sometimes assume that is proportional to the parent's wage rate, w1. We assume also that debt can be left to children--that is, bequests can be negative as well as positive.
The optimization problem as seen by the dynastic head is to maximize ui1ity LJ in equation (10), subject to the budget constraints in equation (12) and to the initial assets k0. In carrying out this maximization, each Individual takes as given the path of wage rates, w1, interest rates, r1, and child-rearing costs, /3. The chosen path of consumption per adult, C0, c1, 300nsumption c, and numbers of descendants N1 must also be non-negative In each generation. However, we neglect integer restrictions on N1. Ponzi games, in hlch the debt grows forever as fast as or faster than the interest rate, would be ruled out if the present value (as of period 0) of debt ipproache zero syrnptotically. The first-order conditions can be obtained in the usual manner, with allowance for a Lagrange multiplier for each period that corresponds to ea::
of the budget constraints in equation (l2). The two sets of first-order conditions are (13) v(c.1)/v'(c1) = (n.)','a(l + r.1),
v
where o(c.) Is again the elasticity of v(c.) with respect to c. There
We pretend that the dynastic head can oick the entire tine path. However esen aU Wlj.i LCC a p&uum LhC JLI, ailU ULU LLae flU iien. -to deviate from the choices made initially. In other words, decisions are time-consistent across generations. Note also that, as long as all the capital stocks k. are positive, bequests from parents to children are als:
positive.
3The second-order condition Is
If 0(c1) Is the constant c, then this condition reduces to a €.
< 1, whic:
Is expression (11).
6We assume that the parameters of the utility function and budget constra:: lead to a finite level of utility. For a steady state with constant value of /3, w, r. c and n, this requires (1 -r) > n, which is the standard condition that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate (of population)
equation (13) the present value of the future capital stock must approach :e: asymptotically. We also use the constraint on borrowing, which is discusse in a. 3 above.
subtract from the cost of rearing a child In generation i-i, valued in goods of generation i (.1(l + r1)). The left side of equation (14) is essentially the effect on utility from adding an additional adult descendant in generation 1, N1, while holding fixed •the total consumption C. of that generation.8 As discussed earlier, this marginal utility must be positive near an optimal position, which ImplIes 1
Equation (14) Indicates that children would be a financial burden to With the definition, a(c.) v'(c1)c1/v(c.), equation (14) can be rewritten as
Differentiate the appropriate term in equation (10) Another important property of the model concerns the effect of changes in we3lth, which we can represent by shifts in the initial assets k0. Equation and the wage rate of descendants, w1, then there is no effect on future consumption per person, c.. In this case it also follows from equation (17) that future fertility, n. for i = 1, 2
does not change with a shift in wealth. With future consumption per capita and future fertility unchanged, the dynastic budget equation (15) implies that either initial consumption, c0.
or fertility, n0, must change. Using equation (17) for I = 0, we can see that an increase (or decrease) In c0 must be accompanied by an increase (or decrease) in no. That is, wealthier persons consume more and also have larger families.
The results imply that an increase in say inherited wealth would increase only the scale of a dynastic family. The number of descendants, and aggregate consumption, C1, in each future generation would increase by the same proportion as the increase in initial fertility, n0. We can see this result directly by recalling that N. = n0n1
.. .
Substitution for each fertility rate from equation (17) leads to
An increase in wealth raises c0 and thereby lowers the marginal utility of wealth, v'(c0). Since all future values of c. are unchanged, equation (18) shows that all future values of rise by the same proportion.
Future capital per person, k. for i = 1, 2
would not change with a shift In wealth because future consumption per person, c., and fertility, fl1
are unchanged. This result follows from the budget conditions in equation (12) and from the dynastic budget constraint in equation (15). Consequently.
bequests to each descendant of the dynastic head are unaffected by a change
In dynastic wealth.
Stated differently, wealth completely regresses to the mean between parents and each child because wealthier parents would spend all of their additional resources on their own consumption and on raising larger families A positive relation between wealth and fertility may help to explain the significant regression toward the mean in the wealth of parents and each child in the United States and other countries (see Becker and Tomes. 1986 , Table 2 ). Although our analysis goes too far by implying complete regressi::
to the mean over one generation, we show below that this extreme result no longer holds if the cost of having children, p., depends on the number of children.
Dynastic utility in equation (6) To illustrate these results, consider a tax on raising children in generation j, which raises p. but does not change p. for i * j. Furthermor to abstract from wealth effects (which we have already discussed), assume compensating increase in initial assets, k0, that leaves the marginal utility of wealth, v'(c0), unchanged. Equation (16) Indicates that Cj1 rises, but all other c1 do not change. Equation (17) indIcates that fertility in generation j falls (chiidren are now more costly to produce), while fertilty in j 1 rIses. Moreover, equation (18) implies that the Increase in fertility in generation j 1 exactly offsets the fall in generation j.
Hence, the nuiaber of descexdan after the (j --l)st generation Is not affected by the tax In geiat1on j.
Similarly, a decreasc n wages for one generation, compensated to hold constant the marginal utIlity of wealth, reduces fertility in the previous generation and raises fertility in the same generation by equal percentages.
Again, the number of descendants in later generations does not change. As it were, the fertility rates of adjacent generations are perfect substitutes in the production of descendants: any change In the net cost of producing descendants in one generation causes enough substitution from the fertility in the succeeding generation to leave unchanged the number of descendants in subsequent generations.
Consider now a permanent increase In the cost of children that raises the net cost of children, 1(l -r11) -w11
, by the same proportion for each generation I > j. re we again hold constant the marginal utility of wealth, v'(c0), equation (16) The permanent increase in for I > j means also that consumption per person, c1 for I > j, is permanently higher. Since is higher while n1 Is unchanged (for i > j), the right side of equation (12) 9mis result assumes that the family's total capital stock is growing at a rate below the interest rate--that is, if the capital stocks are positive,
This condition must hold in a steady state, where k = k and 1 ÷ r > n--see n. 6 above. This modification to t cost of rearing children does not affect the arbitrage condition for shifi,' consumption across generations, as given equation (13). However, the other set of first-order conditions changes that shown in equation (14) to
The expression on the right side Is the net cost of raising an additional Even with a rising or falling marginal cost of rearing children, equation (21) implies that the steady-state value of c depends on the steady-state value of a, and on the values of b'(l + r) and w. Equation (13), in turn,
Implies that the steady-state fertility rate still depends only on the interest rate and the rate of altruism, a.
When the marginal cost of children is constant, we have shown that transitions between steady states take only one generation. Steady states remain stable even when marginal costs are increasing (see Section 2 of the appendix), but transitions now take several generations.
As an example of the dynamic effects that arise, consider an Increase in initial assets, k0. When the marginal cost of children was assumed to be constant, we found that an increase in k0 increased c0 and n0, but did not change future values of c1 and n.. If marginal costs are rising (b'' > Q),
an increase in n raises b'(n0), which increases c1 (by equation (21)). An increase in c1 raises n1 (by equation (13)), which increases c2, and so on.
In this way, the increase in wealth would be spread over increases in The decline in fertility observed since the mid-l9th century in most Western countries has sometimes been xp1ained by rapid economic growth that continues to raise the cost of children through raising the value of parents time (see, for example, Becker, 1981, Chapter 11) . This explanation has not been based on a formal model that links fertility to economic growth, and our model does not have this Implication. As we have seen, a steady rate of economic growth that induced a steady growth in the net cost of descendants would permanently lower fertility, but would not generate a persistent fall in fertility. A persistent fall requires either that interest rates fall steadily, or that economic growth continues to accelerate, or that the net cost of descendants accelerates for other reasons.
The secular decline in fertility has also been explained by the secular decline in child mortality that continued to reduce the number of births required to produce a target number of surviving children. Our analysis also has novel implications about the effects of declines in child mortality on birth rates and the demand for surviving children.
To simplify the presentation, we assume that wage rates and interest rates are constant over time. Also, parents Ignore the uncertainty about (22) implies that the ratio of this expected cost to the expected number of survivors n--which corresponds to our previous cost per (surviving) child--is
/3 = /3
As before, parents choose own consumption, the expected number of surviving children, and beque3ts to surviving children, subject to a budget constraint that depends on /3. A permanent decline in the level of child mortality--that is, a rise in p--that starts in the jth generation would lower the cost of raising surviving children, /3. for I > J. Our prior analysis implies that the demand for surviving children per adult (n1) rises in the .jth generation, but would not be affected In later generations.1°Although the demand for surviving children increases in generation j, birth rates may fall because the higher probability of survival, p, reduces the number of births, b' needed to produce a given number of survivors (see equation (22)). Birth rates definitely fall in later generations because the demand for surviving children in these generations would not be affected by the Increase in p.
The demand for surviving children per adult would increase for more than one generation if the probability of surviving childhood continued to rise, because then the cost of rearing surviving children would continue to fall over time. However, the rate of increase in the survival probability must slow down once this probability approaches unity, as it has in the West during the past forty years. As the rate of increase slows, the rate of decline in the cost of producIng survivors also slows and eventually more or less ceases. Thereafter, the cumulative increase in child survival probability would not affect the demand for surviving children, but would reduce birth rates by the same percentage as the Increase in survival probability.
101f the marginal cost of a child increases with the number of children response to a permanent decline in nortallty rates starting in generation j. But eventually, the demand for surviving children would return to its previous value.
Our analysis of altruistic dynastic families explains why the transition to regimes of low child mortality nay have only temporary effects on population growth, and why changes in birth rates often lag behind changes In child mortality. The analysis implies a rise in population growth during the early phases of the transition, but eventually population growth would return to that prevailing prior to the transition. Correspondingly, the declines in birth rates accelerate, until the percentage decline from prior levels equals the percentage increase in the probability of surviving to adulthood.
The secular decline, in fertility has also been explained partly by the growth in social security and other transfer payments to the elderly. Public transfers to old persons would reduce the demand for children If support from children had been helping to protect parents against 111 health, low earnings, and other conditions of old age. Our model of altruistic families implies that growing transfer payments to the elderly would reduce the demand for children, even when children do not support elderly parents.
The model is not set up to incorporate social security precisely because we have only one period of adulthood, and cannot Introduce payments to old (retired) adults that are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by taxes on young (working) adults. However, similar results obtain If we imagine 11More generally, we need that total social security payments grow slower than the Interest rite--that is. n s. is. < I Therefore, our previous analysis of changes in the costs of children applies to changes in social security. For example, a permanent increase in the level of social security benefits starting in generation ,j is analogous to a permanent increase in p1 at this date. Holding fixed the marginal utility of wealth, v'(c0), we found that fertility n declines, fertility in later generations, n1 for I > j, does not change, and the number of descendants, N. for I > j, falls by the same percentage in each future generation.
Therefore, a permanent increase in social security benefits tends to reduce fertility (temporarily) even when children do not support their parents.12
We also found before that a permanent increase In child-rearing costs in generation j would raise consumption and wealth per person in future eneratjons, c. and 1<. for i > j. In the same way, the negative effect of higher social security benefIts on the number of descendants would be associated with an Increase in "capital intensity." This finding contradicts the usual argument, as in Feldstein (1974) , that social security lowers capital Intensity. That argument treats fertility as exogenous and neglects the interplay between consumption and intergenerational transfers.
Our model implies that the dramatic growth in transfer payments to the elderly during the past 50 years reduced fertility rates. However, it also implies that fertility would return to its prior value once the growth in
12
For discussions of the initial impact of social security, see Becker and Tomes 1976 , n. 15, Wildaslu 1985 , and WillIs 1986 these transfers slowed appreciably. Therefore, in the long run, a larger social security program would not affect fertility rates, but would lower population levels and raise consumption and wealth per person. The growth In consumption per person between generations equals the growth in the net cost of descendants (see equation (28)]. The latter Is negatively related to growth in the probability of child survival, and Is positively related to growth In social security benefits or in other taxes on children. Faster technical progress also raises the growth of consumption per person, at least If the cost of raising children, ,33, tends to grow along with wage rates. Therefore, population growth should be lower in open economies that have more rapid technological progress, more rapid increases in social security benefits, and slower declines in child mortality.
Open Economies and Western
These Implications of our analysis seem relevant to the low fertility in Western countries since the late l960s. World interest rates were low until the l980s--for example, interest rates on short-term U.S. government securities averaged 1.8% per year from 1948 to 1980 after adjusting for anticipated Inflation (see Barro, 1986 Ch. 7). Economic growth was rapid--specifically, the annual rate of growth in per capita real GDP averaged 3.7% per year from 1950 to 1980 in 9 IndustrIalized countries that include the United States (Barro, 1986 Ch. 11) . Child mortality in the West was already quite low by 1950 and did not Improve much further. Social security payments and other transfers to adults expanded dramatically during the past thirty years. For example, per capita real social security payments in the United States and Great Britain grew by 7 1/2 and 5 percent per year, respectively, from 1950 to 1982 (see Hemming, 1984 , and U.S. Department of Commerce, 1965 Commerce, , 1984 . All of these forces tended to hold down population growth.
These considerations also suggest that Western fertility will rise during the next decade if the high real interest rates of the 1980s continue Into the 1990s, If the growth in social security and other transfer payments slows appreciably--as eventually It must--and if the slowdown in economic growth that began In the early 1970s continues. Moreover, fertility could respond sharply even to small changes in Interest rates, in the growth rate of transfer payments, and In rates of economic growth, because changes in these variables are magnified Into larger changes in fertility.
Life-Cycle and Aggregate Consumption
To simplify the presentation, we have assumed that childhood and adulthood are the only periods of life, and that childhood provides no utility. However, we can readily incorporate a full life cycle into the model. We use this extended model to compare the determinants of consumption over the life cycle with the determinants between generations, and also to show how aggregate consumption relates to life-cycle and generational Consumption.
We continue to neglect uncertainty about age of death, but now assume that everyone lives for years. A parent is assumed to have all his children when he is h years old, where the value of h determines the length of a generation. We assume additive preferences over the life cycle, where v(c..) is the utility at age j of each descendant in generation i from the consumption, c1. These current period utilities over the life cycle are discounted by the constant tine-preference factor. 5. Therefore, the utility generated by the lifetime consumption of someone in generation i is (29) v1
Si 1v (C As before, the overall utility of the dynastic head is iii.
i=0 where A. is the weight attached to the utils of generation i. e now note explicitly that A. incorporates both time preference and the degree of altruism toward children. As before, the degree of altruism toward each child vries inversely with the number of children. Specifically, we again assume a function of the form a(n.). Then the weight A in equation (30) is (31) A. = (a8h)(N)€ = Note that the parameter a (which corresponds to the parameter a in our previous model) equals 5h__that is. it includes both altruism (a) and time preference (5h) Substitution from equation (31) Equation (35) is the usual arbitrage relation for life cycles--specifically, it involves the Interest rate, r, and the time-preference factor, 5. Since the right-hand side of equation (35) Equation (36), which is the arbitrage relation across generations, is essentially the same as equation (13). Since the right-hand side of equation (36) is independent of age, j, we find that the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption between generations Is the same for all ages.
We can solve the arbitrage relations for the rates of growth of consumption between ages and generations if we again assume that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is the constant : a 'C. equations (35) and (36) (34) and (38) 
ii (l+r) /3j
The rate of growth in consumption per descendant across generations is the same at all ages, and equals the rate of growth between these generations in the net cost of children. Given the rate of growth of these net costs, the growth of consumption per descendant does not depend on time preference The first term on the right-hand side of equation (43) The second tern on the right-hand side of equation (43) The rate of growth of per capita consumption is then independent of time preference, the degree of altruism, and the interest rate, and depends only on the rate of growth of the cost of children.
Many have recognized that changes over time in per capita consumption are independent of life-cycle changes in consumption when the age distribution is constant (see Deaton, 1985 , for a recent discussion). Some studies justify the use of life-cycle models to interpret the data on aggregate consumption by assuming that the representative person can be modeled as if he lives forever. This procedure is sometimes rationalized by the assumption that parents are altruistic toward children (see, e.g., Summers, 1981, p. 537 We show that the number of descendants in each generation depends on the net cost of producing those descendants. Thus fertility--which determines the change in the number of descendants from one generation to the next--depends on changes in these net costs. For example, a permanent tax on children lowers fertility in the generation that first faces the tax, and permanently lowers the number of descendants in all subsequent generations.
But fertility in later generations is unchanged. We use this result to show that a permanent reduction in the mortality rate initially raises population growth, but has no long-run effect on this growth. Similarly, we find that an expansion of social security has a temporary negative effect on population growth.
We also consider representative dynastic families in open economies that aL'e linked to an international capital market with a single interest rate.
Fertility in open economies depends positively on the world interest rate, on the degree of altruism, and on the growth of child-survival probabilities.
Fertility depends negatively on technological progress, and on the growth rate of transfer payments. We conjecture that this analysis is relevant for explaining fertility in Western countries during recent decades.
We incorporate life-cycle elements by allowing for consumption at various ages. Life-cycle consumption is discounted by time preference, whereas a child's consumption is discounted by time perference and the degree of altruism. We now get the standard result that the pattern of consumption over the life cycle depends on the interest rate and on time preference.
Nevertheless, we still find that the growth rate of consumption between generations depends on the growth rate of the net cost of creating descendants, and not on the interest rate, time preference, or the degree of altruism. At least in the long run, the growth of consumption between generations will dictate the changes in consumption per person for the entire economy. Therefore, we can explain the puzzling finding from long-teri aggregate data that real interest rates and the growth rate of per capita consumption are unrelated.
Thus far, our analysis neglects uncertainty, marriage, the spacing of The second derivatives are (A.4) à2H/c a ct1N10 < 0, (A.5) 2H/ac1afI1
(1 -€.)v!a'N1t -Ad1, (A.8) 2H/N = -€(1 -t)a1N11v and Is positive and less than one (for t > 0). It follows that the path of is (locally) stable and exhibits direct convergence to the steady-state value n.
